

SPIRIT OF THE PRESS.

EDITORIAL OPINIONS OF THE LEADING JOURNALS UPON CURRENT TOPICS—COMPILED EVERY DAY FOR THE EVENING TELEGRAPH.

"PROTECTION" WITH ITS BEST FOOT FORWARD.

From the N. Y. World.

It is fair to presume that, if Mr. Greeley thought the arguments for protection were presented to the best advantage in any of the easily accessible publications already in the book-market, he would not expend superfluous labor in writing his new treatise on "political economy." There are five such publications offered for sale at the *Tribune* office, varying in bulk and price from a ponderous work in three volumes at ten dollars, down to a thin pamphlet at ten cents—an assortment adapted to the intelligence, leisure, and means of every class of readers. Unless Mr. Greeley has new arguments, or can set forth the old ones with more persuasive ability, there is no reason why he should add to the number of existing publications. He, therefore, cannot complain—on the contrary, he must consider himself complimented—if anti-protectionists regard his work not merely as the latest, but as the most skillful, cogent, and formidable defense of protection which has yet appeared. If his reasoning is demolished, and the cause explodes in the hands of its foremost advocate, there is small encouragement for other champions to come into the field. We are therefore pleased to see the numerous testimonials to his pre-eminent competency which Mr. Greeley appends to his second chapter. True, they may seem a little superfluous in the same columns which contain the applauded treatise, since arguments of remarkable strength and clearness might be presumed to attest their own merits; but the endorsements paraded by the *Tribune* have at least the advantage of precluding the minor protectionist journals that make them from saying, after Mr. Greeley is refuted, that a strong cause broke down in the hands of a weak advocate.

In his second chapter, Mr. Greeley makes quite a formal statement and explanation of the principle of protection as he would practically apply it. The germ of his whole treatise is here exhibited with so much elaboration and care that we copy the entire passage. We assure our readers that this long extract is not the ironical forgery of a free-trader intended to turn protective tariffs into derision, but the serious exposition of the leading champion of protection, faithfully copied from the *Tribune* of Saturday, with no other change than printing a few lines in a different kind of type:—

"Now let me show, without reference to existing interests, wherein and why I would apply the principle of protection.

Ten is grown almost wholly in China, Japan, India, and elsewhere, in all latitudes and climates whereof parallels are found in our own country. And we have already ascertained by experiment that the tea-plant germinates, flourishes, and matures in upper South Carolina and in East Tennessee. It should have been noted long since that there are different points throughout the Union; but there is no room for rational doubt that as large an area of this republic as of China will produce tea abundantly and continuously, under proper cultivation.

"Now it is inevitable that, so long as the tea drink by our people shall continue to be grown in China and Japan, the consumers here will pay (quite apart from and above any tax or duty imposed on its importation by our Government) three to six times as much for their tea as the Chinese growers receive for it. The Old Hyson for which our drinkers pay in the average a full dollar (specie) per pound, over and above the tax which goes into our Federal Treasury, has doubtless been bought of the grower for twenty to thirty cents per pound; the residue of the cost to the consumer (less tax) being made up of the profits and charges of the various traders and forwarders, agents and brokers, through whose hands it has passed on its way from the interior of China to the interior of the United States.

"I want to save the millions on millions thus annually expended—I believe uselessly, wastefully expended—to divide them between the grower and consumer of tea, or to secure to him where the same person shall be both grower and consumer. I believe that to pursue this policy is to increase the reward of labor generally, and especially of American labor. Instead of one million persons growing tea in China, one million more mining gold and silver in Nevada to pay for that tea, and other three or four millions employed as merchants, factors, shippers, navigators, canal boatmen, brokers, etc., etc., in transmitting the tea from the grower to the consumer, exchanging his product for the gold and silver where the Chinese are mainly paid, and forwarding that gold and silver (or some equivalent) to our own people growing tea, two millions more producing the various staples and fabrics that our tea-growers receive in exchange for it, to reduce the whole number required to effect the necessary exchanges to one million, and save the gold and silver to reinforce our now dishonored currency and pay off our enormous debt.

"Now I protest that, in maturing and avowing this conviction, as it is identified with contempt or hate of the Chinese—of their paganism, their polygamy, their pigsties, or their reputed fondness for stewed puppies. Whatever there may be of evil or of good in their peculiarities lies entirely outside of the range of my economic conceptions and impulses. I have been swayed by any special addition to tea to tea-growing, nor by any desire to enrich present or prospective tea-growers, much less to endow them with a monopoly, faithful to them but laudable to all others. I have no peculiar affection for them—no desire to promote their interest otherwise than as it is identified with the general good. I perceive and admit the possibility that certain persons might, by an early importation of tea seed, or by growing large quantities of tea plants for sale in advance of most others, secure to themselves peculiar advantages; but this is no reason to do what I did not desire, and care not to obviate. I do not see how those persons can be justly reproached as monopolists, more than the grower of a new American grape or seedling potato. And, if they should proceed to grow tea in advance of their neighbors, and should sell their early crops at exceptionally high prices, I should be rather inclined to rejoice over than deprecate their good fortune, because I am sure it would incite more and more to embark in American tea-growing, and the price thereof would be reduced to an equation with that of other departments of our national industry. Unless a regard for self-interest has been eliminated from human nature, and water has ceased to run down hill, this consequence of large profits accruing in a pursuit open to all is inevitable; and it is this that I seek by protection to secure.

The principle of protection, as expounded by its best-known advocate, requires that the people of the United States shall raise their own tea! Mr. Greeley was never more correct in his logic than he is in this exposition of his "matured" views. We are constrained, for once, to indorse his vigorous logical consistency. We entirely agree with him that, if his premises are sound, his conclusion is inevitable; that the principle of protection, as he has always advocated it, requires the exclusion of Chinese tea from this country and the substitution of tea grown on our own soil. The whole range of possible illustration was open to him; and, in setting forth and explaining his cardinal principle, he has concluded, on "mature" reflection, that it can be

more clearly and correctly presented in the case of tea than of any other production.

The leading object of protection, as Mr. Greeley explains it, is to save the cost of transportation and the profits of exporting and importing merchants. By his computation the labor of one million men in China suffices to produce the tea sold in the American market; and the labor of three or four millions is expended in delivering the Chinese product to the American consumers. This, as he explains it, is the state of the case quite apart from the duties levied on tea by our Government. Why, then, can he not see that, without any duty on tea at all, the American tea-grower would enjoy the constant advantage over his Chinese rival of producing his crop at one-fifth of the cost per pound of the foreign article? Free-traders owe Mr. Greeley an obligation for bringing into prominence the great advantage enjoyed by American producers in their own market in consequence of the cost of transportation. Every reader must perceive that it is superlatively absurd for an American to whine and beg for protection in a case where every laborer he employs can be delivered by the labor of five men engaged in growing and forwarding the rival commodity. All that the native producer can need to be protected against is the sale of the foreign article at a lower price than the cost of producing at home. The case selected by Mr. Greeley is well calculated to elucidate the principle; but it is by no means necessary that the cost of transportation and the profits of intermediate dealers should be three or four times the cost of production in order to protect the native grower against injurious competition. These expenses must always form a considerable part of the price of every imported article, and in all cases where our natural facilities for production are equal to those of the foreigner, these expenses are an all-sufficient and irreparable protection. If, with this great advantage, the native producer can be undersold by his foreign rival, that is conclusive evidence that the country is not adapted to, or not yet ripe for, that kind of production. The American producer is always protected by distance, by the cost of loading and unloading vessels, and by the profits of the exporting and importing merchants. If his business cannot thrive with these advantages, it is badly selected, and he has no right to call on the Government to make up his losses. If, in cases where the expense of transportation and the profits of foreign merchants can be saved, our people are too blind to see their advantage, it is absurd for the Government to interfere; and the absurdity could not be more strikingly illustrated than it is in Mr. Greeley's exposition.

He wants tea "protected." There is already a duty on tea of twenty cents a pound in gold, which is a hundred per cent. of the original cost of production according to his own estimate. By his own reckoning there is an additional protection of something like four hundred per cent. by the labor and expenses of the middlemen. And yet with this enormous protection of five hundred per cent.—four hundred per cent. natural and one hundred per cent. governmental—not a pound of American tea is produced for the market, and Mr. Greeley elaborately sets forth as his nature opinion that American tea growing ought to be forced by "protection." Since the present enormous protection fails, what rate of duty would he have? Utterly posthumous his opinion is, it is identical in principle with the doctrine which has always been taught by the tariff men. Free traders owe Mr. Greeley their thanks for presenting it in so intelligible a form, and making it ridiculous by accepting its legitimate consequences.

It is hardly worth while to criticize his preposterous statistics, for the success of the argument does not depend upon their accuracy. But the writer of a set treatise on political economy owed it to his reputation not to shoot so very wide of the mark. He estimates that six million men are employed in supplying the American market with tea—namely, one million of tea-growers in China, one million laborers in the United States who produce the value with which the tea-growers are paid, and four million sailors, dockmen, and merchants. Now the annual importation of tea, according to the finance report of the Treasury Department, is about forty million pounds; so that each of Mr. Greeley's six million men, earns, on an average, the value of six pounds and ten ounces of tea, worth, according to the average Custom House valuation, about 37 cents a pound! The American consumers of tea who support Mr. Greeley's six million laborers of course pay not only their wages, but the cost of their subsistence; and as the value of all the tea imported into the United States in 1867 was \$12,235,483, the six millions of men employed in supplying the American market with tea live and support their families on about two dollars per annum! Dismissing these inaccuracies without further notice, we call attention to the fact that, while Mr. Greeley thinks that one million men suffice to produce the American supply of tea in China, he thinks it would require two millions in the United States; this virtually retracting his strongly-expressed opinion that the climate of America is as well adapted to tea as that of China. Even in his protectionist hot-bed he would employ five million laborers to supply American consumers with their forty million pounds of tea, rewarding each laborer at the magnificent rate of eight pounds of tea per annum, or about a third of an ounce of tea per day, for his whole wages! As the object of protection, as he explains it, is to save the expense of three or four millions of middlemen, we do not see that he mends the matter much by his scheme of employing five millions of native laborers to supply the American market with home-grown tea.

AMERICAN CITIZENS IN CUBA—THE CASE OF MR. CASANOVA.

From the N. Y. Herald.

The lives and fortunes of several thousands of American citizens are now in a precarious condition in Cuba, under the excitement of the revolutionary contest between Cubans and Spaniards, and the calls upon the Government at Washington for protection and assistance are continually increasing. The numerous questions now arising involve every point of international law affecting friendly intercourse between nations, and possibly involve some which are novel in diplomatic discussion. Besides the great changes which, increased facilities of transit and the extension of commerce have introduced in the practices of nations, as concerns residence and trade, there are in the questions arising in Cuba complications of a very curious and interesting character. The recent case of Senor Casanova will probably present some of these for discussion.

The established law of Cuba recognizes three conditions of political status in the population of the island. These are:—First, natural subjects of the crown of Spain; second, persons holding allegiance to other governments, but who have applied for domiciliary letters in Cuba to enable them to do business there; third, foreigners transiently in

the island. All persons, whatever may be their political status, are permitted to hold property, real and personal, subject to the laws of the land regarding taxation and descent. During the past twenty years circumstances of a political nature in some instances, and of a commercial character in others, have induced many Cubans, holding originally natural allegiance to Spain, to emigrate to the United States and acquire citizenship here, abjuring all other allegiance, but at the same time retaining their property in Cuba in whole or in part. Under our political theories every man has the right to choose his allegiance, and Spain has never denied the right of expatriation to its subjects. It has frequently been the practice of these Cuban emigrants to pass equal portions of the year approximately in the two countries, returning to Cuba on the approach of winter, but always carefully procuring passports setting forth their American citizenship.

The case of Senor Casanova is of this latter class. Long before the appearance of the present political troubles in Cuba he came to this country and acquired the rights of citizenship. He purchased property in the vicinity of New York, where his daughter resides permanently; several of his sons he established in business in this city, while others remained in Cuba superintending the large agricultural operations of the family. His own time he divided between New York and Cuba, the sons carrying on large commercial as well as agricultural transactions. Taking no part in the political questions of the day, Senor Casanova supposed that his person and his property would both be safe, and with all the confidence of an innocent man he pursued his daily avocations. Suddenly and without accusation of any kind military searches were commenced on his plantation, and continued until the natural facilities for production are equal to those of the foreigner, these expenses are an all-sufficient and irreparable protection. If, with this great advantage, the native producer can be undersold by his foreign rival, that is conclusive evidence that the country is not adapted to, or not yet ripe for, that kind of production. The American producer is always protected by distance, by the cost of loading and unloading vessels, and by the profits of the exporting and importing merchants. If his business cannot thrive with these advantages, it is badly selected, and he has no right to call on the Government to make up his losses. If, in cases where the expense of transportation and the profits of foreign merchants can be saved, our people are too blind to see their advantage, it is absurd for the Government to interfere; and the absurdity could not be more strikingly illustrated than it is in Mr. Greeley's exposition.

We give these particulars because they present a clear view of the evils that await thousands of our fellow-citizens in Cuba to-day. Nothing but the prompt and firm action of the Government can save them. The treaty of 1795 with Spain is the only treaty we have with that power that bears upon the question; but the provisions of that treaty are ample, if the Government enforces respect for them. In past cases it has been the practice of Spain to evade the stipulations which provide that every American shall know the accusation against him, and be confronted with the witnesses, and have the right of counsel, by claiming that it never was the intention to grant to foreigners rights which are denied to Spanish subjects. But this pretext is a fallacy, for a treaty negotiated, ratified, and exchanged between two powers becomes the supreme law in the dominions of each.

It becomes, therefore, the duty of the Secretary of State to press upon the Spanish Government our view of the sacred character of American citizenship, which is implied in acts against the law, and the case of Senor Casanova presents the most desirable vehicle for this course. If this is not done, not only will justice be denied in the individual case before us, but a great wrong will be perpetrated upon those of our countrymen still in peril. It is a general question, affecting the honor and interests of the Government as well as the safety of citizens, and if it is remanded to the slough of diplomatic correspondence, we may well despair. The point is this—may Spain permit her subordinates to ignore her treaty with and solemn duties to us, and by wrapping the evil in courtly phrases deny a remedy when prevention should be our demand?

SOWING WIND—REAPING WHIRLWIND.

From the N. Y. Tribune.

Remarkable figures occur in our correspondence from Havana. By that very rare document, Queen Isabella's farewell budget for Cuba of the year ending with June, we have an understanding of the various extravaganzas with which Spain has expended her oppressions on the island. Its income was estimated at nearly twenty-five million dollars; its expenditures at thirty-one millions. The main expenses of administration were about four millions. The Church received not far from five millions of dollars. The Captain-General was paid fifty thousand dollars a year, exclusive of palatial expenses. These were the charges of a peace footing. The war has been carried on at double the rate of the budget, to say the least. The Government stands debtor to its bank at Havana for not less, we presume, than twenty, perhaps thirty millions.

These figures sort well with those which reach us from Spain. Minister Figueroa reports his budget at about \$157,500,000 on the side of expenses. The estimates of income are about \$110,000,000, some say \$95,000,000. Ways and means must be devised to harvest this income, and supply a deficit amounting to the very large sum of forty-seven millions. The aggregate items of war and marine cost Spain about thirty-five millions of dollars, counting none of the Cuban expenditure. Not a cent of the war more than that which such as Spain, and even supports a navy at half her expense. The interest upon the debt of the country is forty-five millions, increased by the bequest of debt left by Isabella, and amounting to something short of one hundred and twenty-five millions. When the late Government went out of business, the general debt was over one billion, and at the end of November it reached to one billion and a half. The Government of Prim and Serrano squandered at the rate of nearly one hundred and thirty-five millions a month.

What has brought upon Spain her debt and her crisis it is not difficult to reckon. She has wasted money equally upon her ideas and her want of them. Millions she has sunk uselessly in her harbors and rivers, and in the pockets of contractors and courtiers; millions have gone to prevent what her statesmen of material progress, but which in reality has proved material loss; millions have been stolen by various banditti in the name of liberty; many millions have been wasted in subventions for unprofitable railroads. But the resources at command of Spain are still large enough to interest a financier of genius. She has six hundred convents, four thousand unattended chapels, various episcopal palaces, one hundred and twenty seminaries, forty thousand places where mass is said, including twenty-six thousand regular churches. The woods and forests of the crown are worth thirty-five million dollars; the Church lands, one hundred and fifty millions; the mines, thirty-five millions. Her sundry properties amount in all to five hundred millions of dollars, part of which guarantees the debt. We know not the exact

system of the revenues and the commerce of Spain, but that their management is unsavory and unintelligent we have scarce a chance to disbelieve. We are told by some observers that the country is prospering and increasing, while the treasury is empty, and financial ruin stares the nation in the face. It is hard to reconcile these two statements, but they contain a large measure of truth. Spain has no chance but to waste, and any undertaking beyond the administration of her peace must be ruinous to her. The struggle, therefore, for her possessions in the Antilles is a fatal one, and worse than useless. We shall not be far off the mark if we say that its end will be determined not by the sword but by the scales, and that Spain must either sell it or lose it utterly. Read in the light of common sense, the figures we have given are the most certain prognostic we have of the imminent fate of Spanish power in America.

MAZZINI AND ITALY.

From the N. Y. Times.

Signor Mazzini, writing from his exile in Switzerland, has published a kind of political manifesto in the form of a lengthy letter headed "To My Enemies." He has recently been forbidden by the Swiss Government to reside in any of the cantons bordering on Italy, and hence, apparently, though not avowedly, arises the burst of fierce and passionate declamation which he has addressed to the *Tribuna* of Lugano. He avows more absolutely than ever his belief in the necessity of republican institutions for the welfare, or even the existence, of a united Italy, and he denounces more bitterly than ever existing *tyrannies*. While expressing his firm conviction that the establishment of a republic in Italy is but a question of a few years, to be brought about in the natural course of events, he more definitely than ever avows his intention, and that of his party, to do all that lies in their power to overthrow the Italian Government, and to place the doctrines and principles of republicanism before the people. If the laws of Italy forbid them to organize publicly, they will organize in secret. If they are prohibited from openly advocating their views, they will do it by means of secret societies. If their demonstrations are repressed by force, they will continue to arm, so that when the day comes "when we call upon the people to choose between us and you, we may not weakly fall unarmed into the hands of your police, your carabinieri, and such of your soldiers who still remain enslaved and deceived, and fail to unite with us in action." He repudiates assassination, and denies that "rebellion" is possible, save against the true sovereign, the people. Italy, he says, is republican by tradition—the birth and growth of her natural life were republican, as also her social institutions; her proudest records have been those of her republican days, and her greatest men have been republicans. Monarchy and its concomitants have been implanted in Italy "as the period of her moral decay, under the auspices and armed protection of foreign traders." And, though he regards the purely political situation one which can only result in the triumph of Republicanism, he intends to strive, with all the power and energy he possesses, in order to save the Italian people from the "gangrene of dishonor" from which they suffer during the existence of a monarchy.

This is strong language, and if Mazzini were still the political power which he once was, would be dangerous in the extreme to the peace of Europe. But at the present day it is little more than sound and fury. If the existing institutions of Italy are in reality alien to the genius of the Italian people, the fact will soon be made manifest without Mazzinian agitation. And whatever the faults and shortcomings of Victor Emmanuel's Government, we fail to see that Signor Mazzini and his friends hold out any reasonable prospect of establishing any alternative government that could at once develop the freedom of Italy, maintain her unity and preserve the friendship of her powerful neighbors. There are many things in the condition of Italy at the present moment which give cause for anxiety to her best friends, but we fear we cannot look to Signor Mazzini for its permanent amelioration.

THE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA, INCORPORATED IN PENNSYLVANIA. OFFICE, NO. 435 AND 437 CHESTNUT ST. ASSETS ON JAN. 1, 1869, \$2,677,372.13. CAPITAL, \$400,000.00. ACCUMULATED SURPLUS, \$1,052,227.78. UNPAID CLAIMS, \$1,193,413.43. LOSSES PAID SINCE 1829, OVER \$5,000,000.00. PERPETUAL AND TEMPORARY POLICIES ON ALL TERMS. THE COMPANY ALSO ISSUES POLICIES ON RENTS OF BUILDING OF ALL KINDS, GROUND RENTS, AND MORTGAGES.

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The Navy Department will offer for sale, at Public Auction, at the United States Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., on the 19th day of June, at 12 o'clock M., the iron side-wheel Steamer SHAMOKIN, of 1029 tons, old measurement.

At the United States Navy Yard, Philadelphia, on the 21st day of June, at 12 o'clock M., the iron side-wheel Steamer HORNET, of 820 tons, old measurement.

The vessels and their inventories can be examined at any time, on application to the Commandants of the respective Navy Yards. The whole amount of the purchase money must be deposited at the time of adjudication, and the vessels must be removed from the navy yards within two weeks from the day of sale.

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125,000 City of New York Six Per Cent. Loan (exempt from tax), 10-30/100

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50,000 Penn. Rail. First Mortgage Six Per Cent. Bonds, 10-30/100

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50,000 State of Tennessee Five Per Cent. Loan, 10-30/100

75,000 State of Tennessee Six Per Cent. Loan, 10-30/100

15,000 City of New York Six Per Cent. Loan, 10-30/100

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